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Gray markets arise when a manufacturer’s products are sold outside of its authorized 
channels, for instance when goods designated for a foreign market are resold 
domestically.  One method multinationals use to combat gray markets is to increase 
internal transfer prices to foreign subsidiaries in order to increase the gray market’s cost 
base. We illustrate that, when a gray market competitor is present, the optimal price for 
internal transfers not only exceeds marginal cost, but is also a function of  the 
competitiveness of the upstream  economy.  Moreover, the presence of a gray market 
competitor may cause unintended social welfare consequences when domestic 
governments mandate the use of arm’s length transfer prices between international 
subsidiaries. When markets are sealed, arm’s length transfer pricing strictly increases 
domestic social welfare.  In contrast, we demonstrate that when a gray market competitor 
is present, mandating the use of arm’s length transfer pricing  decreases domestic social 
welfare when the domestic market is sufficiently large relative to the foreign market. 
Specifically, a shift to arm’s length transfer pricing erodes domestic consumer surplus by 
making the gray market less competitive domestically, which in turn may offset any 
domestic welfare gains that accompany a shift to arm’s length transfer pricing. Finally, 
the analysis illustrates that in a gray market setting, the transfer price that maximizes a 
multinational’s profits may also be the same one that maximizes the social welfare of the 
domestic economy that houses it. 
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1. Introduction 
Gray market  goods are brand name products that are initially sold into a 
designated market but then resold through unofficial channels into a different market.  
This paper considers goods originally sold in a foreign market and then reimported 
domestically through channels unauthorized by the trademark owner. Gray markets can 
arise when transaction and search costs are low enough to allow products to “leak” from 
one market segment back into another. Examples of industries with active gray markets 
include pharmaceuticals, automobiles, and electronics. Understandably, reactions to gray 
market encroachment are mixed.  
On the one hand, consumer advocates and governments have applauded the 
increasing role that gray markets have played in improving competition for domestic 
goods. This sentiment has been supported in the U.S. by court rulings that have left 
copyright holders with little means of enforcing contracts prohibiting the unauthorized 
importation of goods from foreign countries.
1  Moreover, several international regulatory 
authorities have gone so far as to take proactive stances to curbing firms’ efforts to negate 
gray markets. For example, the European Commission recently sent a statement of 
objection to Apple Inc. for restricting its customers to buying products solely from online 
stores in their own country –  a practice which effectively eliminates gray market 
activity.
2
On the other hand, multinationals have decried the increasing role of gray markets 
in the economy, with an estimated $40 billion in cannibalized sales resulting from gray 
markets in the information technology sector alone (estimate by the Alliance for Gray 
Market and Counterfeit Abatement; see 
 
www.agmaglobal.org). Additionally, theory and 
evidence (see for example, Li and Robles (2007)) suggest that gray markets may stifle the 
incentive to innovate, as gray markets prevent firms from reaping the full rewards of their 
research and development. 
                                                           
1 Quality King Distributors Inc., v. L'anza Research International Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998) 
 
2 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6520677.stm, accessed 31 January 2009.   2 
  Anecdotal evidence in Assmus and Weise (1995) and Antia et al. (2004) suggests 
several methods that multinationals might use to combat gray markets. The methods can 
be loosely categorized as either preventing gray market activity or punishing gray market 
activity.  Examples of actions taken  to prevent gray market activity include 
differentiating products across regions  and reducing arbitrage opportunities (such as 
modifying transfer prices or retail prices).  Examples of punishing gray market activity 
include  fines, legal action, and  withholding reward programs  (such as manufacturer 
rebates or access to the newest products). However, as punishing gray market activity 
requires that the multinational be able to identify the elusive  responsible party –  an 
expensive and extremely time-consuming task – many firms employ prevention methods 
as their primary defense against gray market activity.   
In choosing among the various methods of prevention, multinationals are often 
reluctant to specify worldwide retail prices because doing so sacrifices the fundamental 
benefits of pricing for local markets: specifically, setting prices to accommodate local 
demand and the ability to act swiftly to local changes in competition and preferences 
(Assmus and Weise (1995), Antia et al. (2004)).  Accordingly, this paper focuses on the 
inflation of internal transfer prices to foreign subsidiaries as a mechanism to combat gray 
market activity. The intuition behind the strategy is straightforward. Higher transfer 
prices increase the foreign arm’s cost base which leads to higher end-user prices in the 
foreign market and a higher cost base for the gray market. The higher the gray market’s 
cost base, the less competitive it is when it reimports product back into the domestic 
market, and the fewer the sales it cannibalizes from the domestic parent.  
The findings in Assmus and Weise (1995) imply that gray market activity may 
influence the optimal price for internal transfers between a multinational’s affiliated 
segments. There is an extensive literature which assesses optimal transfer pricing 
between related parties, starting with the seminal work of Hirshleifer (1956).  The 
findings in Hirshleifer (1956) are particularly applicable to the gray market setting. 
Hirshleifer (1956) finds that if an affiliated downstream division is a price setter, and 
upstream and downstream markets are sealed from one another, then the optimal price for 
internal transfers is the marginal cost of the upstream division. However, if there is   3 
product leakage from the downstream market to the upstream one, then  the optimal 
transfer price falls between the transferred product’s marginal cost and its market price.  
Consistent with Hirshleifer (1956) and anecdotal evidence in Assmus and Weise 
(1995), we find that the optimal price of a multinational’s internal transfers is the 
transferred product’s marginal cost when international market segments are sealed from 
one another. However, when a gray market “leaks” product from a foreign market to a 
domestic one, the optimal transfer price falls between marginal cost and the arm’s length 
price.
3
Consistent with this intuition, we find that a shift from the multinational’s profit 
maximizing transfer price to an arm’s length transfer price leads to strict increases in 
domestic social welfare when the foreign and domestic markets are sealed from one 
another. However, we find unintended social welfare consequences from a similar shift to 
arm’s length transfer pricing when a gray market firm leaks product from a foreign 
market to a domestic one. Specifically, shifting to the arm’s length standard erodes 
  We provide an extension to Hirshleifer’s results  by also defining the optimal 
transfer price as a function of both the level of differentiation between the foreign and 
domestic product and the number of competitors in the domestic market. Additionally, 
while Hirshleifer illustrates that the optimal transfer price between affiliated segments is 
a function of the nature of downstream competition, we illustrate that, conditional on 
there being product leakage from the downstream to the upstream market, the optimal 
transfer price is additionally a function of the nature of upstream competition. 
While the results suggest several new determinants to explain variation in 
intracompany discounts across multinationals, we note that a multinational’s discretion to 
set internal transfer prices is typically restricted by the domestic government that 
regulates it. In the case of the U.S., multinationals must set transfer prices to foreign 
subsidiaries at arm’s length via one of several prescribed methods. One presumed benefit 
to imposing the arm’s length standard is that doing so should maximize domestic social 
welfare, by maximizing the profits repatriated domestically from a foreign market.  
                                                           
3 This result also adds to the literature that finds benefits to pricing internal transfers above marginal cost 
despite potential decreases in channel efficiency (see, Arya and Mittendorf (2007), Arya and Mittendorf 
(2008) and Arya et al. (2008)).   4 
consumer surplus in the domestic market by making the gray market a comparatively 
high cost producer and, in turn, less competitive domestically. We characterize the 
circumstances under which the welfare destruction arising from this erosion dominates 
the welfare gains which arise from the increase in repatriated foreign profits to the 
multinational’s domestic arm. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, we find that in a gray 
market setting, the transfer price that maximizes a multinational’s profits may also be the 
same one that maximizes the social welfare of the domestic economy that houses it.  
This study’s principal contribution is to challenge the notion that allowing 
multinationals the discretion to set their own internal transfer prices leads to benefits 
which help only the multinational. In this respect, the results echo those in Smith (2002). 
Smith (2002) finds that allowing firms the ex post discretion to set transfer prices can 
lead to favorable ex ante resource allocation and efficiency gains that potentially offset 
any reduction in tax receipts. In a similar vein, we find that allowing firms to act 
opportunistically when gray markets encroach may lead to increases in consumer surplus 
that exceed any decreases to social welfare that arise by not following the arm’s length 
standard, especially when the domestic market is large relative to the foreign market. 
Finally, this study provides several avenues for tax regulators to more effectively allocate 
resources for enforcement, as well as an analytic underpinning that helps explain 
variations in intracompany discounts across multinationals and the perceived lax attitude 
of enforcement officials when imposing the arm’s length standard. 
  The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model. Section 3 
presents the analysis and discusses the results. Section 4 concludes. 
2.  Model Setup 
Consider a multinational firm  that manufactures a product domestically and 
distributes it both domestically and in a foreign country. Domestically, the multinational 
sells its product through a wholly owned subsidiary (denoted firm 0) which competes 
against  n  domestic competitors ( 0 n ≥ ).
4
                                                           
4 When n=0, the domestic firm is a monopolist. 
 
  Each domestic competitor produces  a   5 
differentiated substitute of firm 0’s product. The quantity of firm i’s product sold in the 
domestic market, D, is denoted 
D
i q , i=0,…,n. Demand from domestic consumers for firm 








i P   is the retail price of firm i’s product in the domestic market, 
and ( ] 0,1 γ ∈  is the degree of product differentiation in the domestic market; when  1 γ = , 
all products sold in the domestic market are perfect substitutes.
6
Additionally, the multinational sells its product in a foreign market (denoted with 
an F superscript) via a profit maximizing, related foreign subsidiary (denoted firm 0 in 
the foreign market). For simplicity, we assume that the foreign subsidiary has a 
monopoly in its respective market. The foreign subsidiary sells quantity 
 For greater tractability, 
we normalize the marginal cost of each firm’s product to 0. 
0
F q and faces a 
downward sloping demand curve where  00
FF
F Pq α = − . The multinational’s central 
planner maximizes the multinational’s profits by setting the price for internal transfers 




 By setting a transfer price 
of  p, the multinational repatriates profits of   from the foreign subsidiary  to the 
domestic subsidiary. 
                                                           
5 This functional form enables us to assess the impact of upstream competition on the optimal transfer price 
between affiliated segments. 
 
6 Often, insights derived under Cournot quantity competition are reversed under Bertrand price competition 
(e.g., see Bulow et al. (1985), Göx (2000)), making it important to check robustness under price 
competition. This is particularly important in our setting because the nature of the competition is a 
predominant feature (i.e., we have n  domestic competitors).  When we recast the model as Bertrand 
competition, the paper’s inferences are unchanged provided γ is not too large (i.e., γ < ~.95). 
 
7  Although in certain jurisdictions multinational firms are allowed to decouple their transfer price for 
internal and tax purposes (see Baldenius et al. (2004), Johnson (2006)), we use a single transfer price as 
management’s decision variable. In the past,  there has been mixed evidence on the use of decoupled 
transfer prices (e.g., see Ernst and Young (1999), Halperin and Srinidhi (1991)).  However, recent 
empirical evidence suggests that over 80% of multinationals use a single set of transfer prices for 
management and tax purposes (Ernst and Young (2003), p.17). Respondents in Ernst and Young (2003) 
suggest that a single set of transfer prices can “enhance the defensibility of transfer prices, ease 
administrative burden, and add to the effectiveness of a transfer pricing program.”  Additionally, while 
Bernard et al. (2005) hypothesize the use of decoupled transfer prices in their model, their empirical results 
are consistent with a single set of transfer prices.     6 
Finally, we assume that there are no differences in corporate tax rates between the 
domestic and foreign country. While variation in tax rates across countries may lead to 
variation in internal transfer prices across multinationals, there is already a robust 





 As the scope of this paper is to assess the impact that gray markets have on 
internal transfer prices, we exogenously hold taxes constant and equal across markets.    
3. Analysis and Discussion  
In this section, we begin by deriving the optimal transfer pricing policy under two 
scenarios: sealed markets (no leakage across markets, as a benchmark scenario) and gray 
markets (when a gray market firm reimports goods from the foreign market back to the 
domestic one). Next, we derive the arm’s length transfer price under each scenario and 
compare these transfer prices to the firm’s optimal transfer prices.  Additionally, we 
assess the domestic social welfare implications of mandating arm’s length transfer prices.  
Finally, for robustness, we characterize when the multinational firm enters the foreign 
market, despite supplying the gray market and thereby reducing profits in the domestic 
market.  
3.1 Quantity Competition with Sealed Market Segments 
  We begin by deriving the optimal transfer pricing policy in an economy with 
sealed market segments. We solve the model by backward induction.  Given a transfer 
price, p, the domestic and foreign subsidiaries choose  and  0
F q  to maximize profits of 
0
D π  and 0
F π , respectively. We assume end user quantities and prices are strictly positive 
and transfer prices are weakly positive. The timeline is shown in Figure 1.  
 
                                                           
8There is a substantial literature that assesses the impact of differences in tax jurisdictions on the price of 
internal transfers. For example, see Copithorne (1971), Horst (1971), Samuelson (1982), Halperin and 
Srinidhi (1987), Harris and Sansing (1998), Sansing (1999), Narayanan and Smith (2000) and Smith 
(2002).   7 
 
Figure 1:  Timeline in a Sealed Market Setting 
 
The foreign subsidiary, firm 0 in the foreign market, chooses  0
F q  to maximize profit: 
0




Max q q pq πα
>0
 = −−              (1) 
The domestic subsidiary, firm 0 in the domestic market, chooses  0
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Solving the first order conditions from (1), (2) and (3) yields the equilibrium quantities 
0 ()
F qp  and  , 0...
D
i qi n = . Given these quantities, the multinational sets its internal transfer 
price to maximize overall profit. 
( ) ( ) 00 0
DF
p Max p p ππ
≥ = +              (4) 
Solving the first order condition from (4) yields the optimal transfer price, 
D p . Using the 
equilibrium quantities chosen by the firm’s subsidiaries and competitors in response to 
the internal transfer price selected by the multinational’s headquarters and simplifying 
(1), (2) and (3) yields equilibrium profits, as summarized in Lemma 1. 
Quantities are simultaneously chosen by 
the foreign subsidiary in the foreign 
market and by the domestic subsidiary 
and competitors in the domestic market. 
 
Consumers make their 
purchases and firm profits 
are realized. 
The multinational 
chooses the foreign 
transfer price, p.   8 
Lemma 1. When markets are sealed, the equilibrium outcomes are as follows: 
1.  The optimal internal transfer price to the foreign subsidiary is  0
D p = . 
2.  The equilibrium quantities chosen by the foreign subsidiary, the domestic 
subsidiary, and the domestic competitors, respectively, are   
  0 2
F F q
α

















3.  The equilibrium profits of the foreign subsidiary, the domestic subsidiary, and the 


























=≠  + 
. 
Proof: all proofs are in the Appendix. 
  Given that the domestic and foreign markets are sealed from one another, it is 
unsurprising that the optimal transfer price,
D p , is the domestic firm’s marginal cost. This 
result  replicates  the findings in Hirshleifer (1956), which illustrates that the optimal 
transfer price for an internal transfer is the product’s marginal cost when markets are 
sealed and the downstream division is a price setter.  In such a setting, the only 
consequence to raising transfer prices above zero is to induce double marginalization in 
the foreign subsidiary and, consequently, lower the profits of both the foreign subsidiary 
and the multinational. 
3.2 Quantity Competition with a Gray Market Entrant 




F q α −
 We define the gray market as a 
domestic firm (denoted as firm g in the domestic market) that purchases the foreign 
subsidiary’s product in the foreign market at a cost of   (i.e., the market price of 
the product being sold in the foreign market) and then resells it in the domestic market. 
When the gray market firm is included in the economy, it becomes the domestic 
subsidiary’s n+1
th domestic competitor. Note that the gray market firm has a capacity 
                                                           
9 We use the superscript GF to denote the foreign market and GD to denote the domestic market in the gray 
market setting. 
   9 
constraint, in that it can only sell as much product as the foreign subsidiary sells in the 
foreign market.  
Additionally,  we assume that,  like  the other domestic competitors, the gray 
market firm sells a substitute good differentiated from the domestic subsidiary’s product 
by  γ .
10 This assumption is based on the observation that products produced for foreign 
markets often differ from their domestic counterparts to meet local preferences  (e.g., 
colors, sizes) or local regulations (e.g., emissions, labeling). Furthermore, when these 
products are reimported domestically, evidence suggests that at least some of the 
domestic consumers prefer the foreign product because  of this differentiation. For 
example, the Mexican version of Coca-Cola is often reimported through unofficial 
channels to the United States. The Mexican version tastes different than the American 
one, and is sometimes preferred by American consumers.
11
Finally, in this setting, the foreign market is now comprised of consumers who are 





 As in the sealed market setting, we assume that end user quantities 
and prices are strictly positive and transfer prices are weakly positive. Figure 2 shows the 
timeline of the game including gray markets. 
 
Figure 2:  Timeline in a Gray Market Setting  
                                                           
10 For tractability, we assume the gray market good has the same degree of product differentiation as the 
goods of domestic competitors.  In robustness checks (see footnote 12), we relax this assumption with no 
impact on the interpretation of our results, although the expressions are substantially more complex. 
 
11Gray Markets – a gray area of business ethics, Jerusalem Post, January 13
th, 2006. 
 
12 Although the presence of a gray market firm could increase the size of the foreign market, for tractability 
we have not modeled changes to the intercept of the inverse demand function.  However our results are 
robust to using a larger intercept for the foreign subsidiary’s inverse demand function, F α , in the gray 
market setting.  A larger foreign intercept increases the likelihood that the multinational enters the foreign 
market (Proposition 6) and that the gray market’s capacity constraint is non-binding (Proposition 1). 
The multinational 
chooses the foreign 
transfer price, p. 
In the domestic 
market, consumers 
purchase and firm 
profits are realized. 
Quantities are simultaneously 
chosen by the domestic 
subsidiary and competitors in 
the domestic market. 
 
The foreign subsidiary chooses 
quantity in the foreign market.  
In the foreign market, consumers 
purchase and the subsidiary’s 
profits are realized.   10 
The foreign subsidiary chooses  0
GF q  to maximize its profits: 
  
0
00 0 0 GF
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q
Max q q pq πα
>0
 = −−              (5) 
The domestic subsidiary chooses  0
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The gray market firm chooses 
GD
g q  to maximize its profits: 
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    (8) 
  Jointly solving the first order conditions for Equations (6), (7), and (8) yields 
equilibrium quantities as a function of the transfer price  and foreign quantity, 
( ) 0 , , 0,..., ,
GD GF
i q pq i ng = . Solving the first order condition in Equation (5) yields the 
equilibrium foreign quantity as a function of the transfer price, denoted  ( ) 0
GF qp . 
Substituting  ( ) 0
GF qp into  ( ) 0 , , 0,..., ,
GD GF
i q pq i ng =   yields  ( ), 0,..., ,
GD
i q p i ng = .  Given 
these quantities the firm sets the optimal transfer price, p, to maximize the sum of the 
profits of its domestic and foreign division. 
( ) ( ) 00
GD GF
p Max p p ππ = +              (9) 
Solving (9) yields the optimal transfer price, 
GD p . Substituting 
GD p  into both 
( ), 0,..., ,
GD
i q p i ng =  and  ( ) 0
GF qp  yields optimal quantities  , 0,..., ,
GD
i q i ng =  and  0
GF q ,   11 
respectively.  Using  these optimal quantities and 
GD p   yields optimal profits for each 
domestic firm  , 0,..., ,
GD
i i ng π = and the foreign subsidiary  0
GF π .
13
( ) 2 (1 ) An γ ≡+ +
  These results are 
summarized in Lemma 2. 
Lemma 2. With a gray market entrant, the equilibrium outcomes are as follows, where 
: 
1.  The equilibrium quantities chosen by the foreign subsidiary, the domestic firms, 











































2.  The optimal internal transfer price to the foreign subsidiary 
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3.  The equilibrium profits of the foreign subsidiary, the domestic subsidiary, the 
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.  
                                                           
13 For robustness, we also solve the model using three alternate specifications. In the first specification, we 
make firm 0’s product and the gray market good perfect substitutes which are both differentiated from the n 
domestic competitors byγ . In the second specification, we make firm 0’s product and those of its n 
domestic competitors perfect substitutes which are differentiated from the gray market product by γ . In the 
third specification we allow the domestic consumers to exhibit a higher willingness to pay for the domestic 
goods than gray market goods (following intuition from Ahmadi and Yang (2000)). The tenor of all of the 
paper’s results remain unchanged using any of the alternate specification.   12 
Finally, recall that the gray market quantity is subject to two constraints.  First, 
the gray market quantity must be non-negative (the non-negativity constraint).  Second, 
the gray market supply is limited to the quantity sold by the foreign subsidiary  (the 
capacity constraint).  We restrict our attention to the case where both constraints are met.  
The following observation summarizes a few relevant properties of these constraints.   
Observation 1. In a gray market setting, the quantity constraints have the following 
properties: 
1.  Ceteris paribus, a decrease in transfer price
GD p  makes it more likely that both gray 
market quantity constraints are met. 
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Decreasing the transfer price increases the quantity sold by the foreign subsidiary, 
which in turn lowers the retail price in the foreign market (i.e., the gray market’s cost 
base).  Hence  the  gray market  purchases  a higher quantity, and the non-negativity 
constraint  is  more likely to be met. Further, the quantity increase by  the foreign 
subsidiary is larger than the increase in the gray market’s quantity, making the capacity 
constraint more likely to be met as well. 
Intuitively, the constraints on the gray market quantities represent the following 
tradeoff: if the domestic market is sufficiently large relative to the foreign market, then 
the demand for gray market goods is strong but the supply (constrained by the smaller 
foreign market) may not be available.  On the other hand, if the foreign market is   13 
sufficiently large relative to the domestic market, then supply is not a problem but there 
may be too little demand from the gray market competitor, because a relatively large 
foreign market also increases the gray market’s cost base, making it less competitive 
when it reimports domestically.  
Our first result relates to the multinational firm’s optimal internal transfer price, 
and is formalized below in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1: When a gray market firm is present in the economy, the multinational 
firm’s optimal transfer price to the foreign subsidiary, 
GD p , has the following properties. 
1. 
GD p is a function of domestic competition and is decreasing in the number of 
domestic competitors.  
2. 
GD p converges to the optimal  transfer price in a sealed market, 
D p , as the 
domestic market approaches perfect competition (n →∞) or as the products 
become perfectly differentiated ( 0 γ → ). 
3. 
GD p is strictly above marginal cost for all ( ] 0,1 γ ∈ . 
 
While transfer prices to the foreign subsidiary are strictly above marginal cost in the 
gray market setting (consistent with Hirshleifer 1956), they also decrease as competitive 
pressures increase in the domestic market. This result arises due to two forces. First, as 
the number of competitors increases in the domestic market, the gray market firm faces 
increasingly lower prices domestically. Thus, increasing the cost base of the gray market 
firm with higher transfer prices has a smaller benefit when comparatively low prices in 
the domestic market already reduce the gray market’s competitiveness. At the extreme 
(perfect competition), the entry of a gray market player has no impact on the domestic 
firm’s consumer demand.  Second, as n increases, there is an increased incentive on the 
multinational’s part to maximize its profits in the less competitive foreign market. Both 
factors lead to a deflationary pressure on the price of internal transfers as n increases.  
Separately, as gray market goods become perfectly differentiated from domestic goods, 
they have no impact on the domestic firm’s consumer demand and thus the firm’s optimal 
transfer price is the same as in a sealed market.   14 
  Finally, points 1 and 3 provide an important extension to the results in Hirshleifer 
(1956). While Hirshleifer illustrates that the optimal transfer price between affiliated 
segments is a function of the nature of downstream competition, we illustrate that, 
conditional on there being product leakage from the downstream to the upstream market, 
the optimal transfer price is additionally a function of the nature of upstream competition.  
3.3 Arm’s Length Transfer Prices 
  A firm’s discretion to offer intracompany discounts between its subsidiaries is 
restricted by legislation affecting member countries of the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (“OECD nations”) to follow the arm’s length standard. In 
the United States, the reported transfer price must be “consistent with the results that 
would have been realized if uncontrolled taxpayers had engaged in the same transaction 
under the same circumstances” (Treasury Regulations §1.482-1(b)(1)). In our setting, we 
take the comparable uncontrolled price to be the price that the domestic segment would 
have charged an unrelated foreign third party for its product. When calculating a firm’s 
arm’s length transfer price, we additionally take compliance with the standard as given, 
as the purpose of this exercise is to assess the profitability and social welfare 
consequences of a firm shifting from its optimal transfer price to an arm’s length transfer 
price, were the arm’s length standard perfectly enforceable.  
We derive the arm’s length transfer price by solving for the transfer price which 
maximizes the domestic subsidiary’s  profits. In an economy with sealed market 
segments, we solve as before, but the multinational maximizes (10) instead of (4) to 
obtain the arm’s length transfer price. 
( ) 0
D
p Max p π =                (10) 
In an economy with a gray market entrant, we again solve as before except the 
multinational maximizes (11) instead of (9) to obtain the arm’s length transfer price. 
( ) 0
GD
p Max p π =               (11) 
The resulting arm’s length transfer prices are presented in Lemma 3.   15 
Lemma 3. The arm’s length transfer prices that maximize the domestic subsidiary’s 
profits are as follows, where  ( ) 2 (1 ) An γ ≡+ + : 





2.  In a market with a gray market entrant, the arm’s length transfer price is 
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Proposition 2. In both sealed market and gray market settings, the arm’s length transfer 
prices are strictly higher than the transfer prices that maximize the multinational firm’s 
profit. 
Corollary 1. With a gray market entrant, the arm’s length transfer price is decreasing in 
the competitiveness of the domestic market.  The arm’s length transfer price in a gray 
market setting converges to that in a sealed market as the domestic market approaches 
perfect competition (n →∞) or as the products become perfectly differentiated ( 0 γ → ). 
Arm’s length transfer prices are strictly larger than the multinational’s optimal 
transfer price  because  the objective functions in (10) and (11) no longer incorporate 
profits from the foreign subsidiary. Because  the foreign division’s profit function is 
decreasing in the transfer price, its removal no longer disciplines the multinational’s 
transfer price lower. This, in turn, leads to strictly larger transfer prices. Next,  as in 
Corollary 1, the arm’s length transfer price in a gray market setting is decreasing in the 
number of competitors in the domestic market.  Finally, as the domestic market becomes 
perfectly competitive, the entry of a gray market player has no impact on the domestic 
firm’s consumer demand.  Similarly, as gray market goods become perfectly 
differentiated from domestic goods, they have no impact on the domestic firm’s 
consumer demand and thus the firm behavior resembles that of a sealed market.   16 
3.4 Social Welfare 
In this subsection, we assess the social welfare ramifications (in a single period) 
of mandating the arm’s length transfer prices in Lemma 3 rather than permitting the 
multinational to choose its optimal transfer price as presented in Lemmas 1 and 2.
14 For 
tractability purposes, we assume in this subsection that the domestic firm is a monopolist 
in the domestic market (i.e., n=0), as ceteris paribus, the social welfare ramifications of a 
shift in transfer pricing regimes should be more pronounced the less competitive the 
setting.
15
While we assess the changes in social surplus following a shift to arm’s length 
transfer pricing for all economies (domestic, foreign and worldwide), the primary focus 
of this section is the effect of mandated arm’s length transfer pricing on domestic social 
surplus. The reason is that, while the OECD transfer pricing regulations were initiated to 
maintain tax fairness among member and several non-member nations, the decision of a 
domestic government to enforce  the standards is presumably initiated  in order to 
maximize domestic social surplus.  For example, in 2009 the U.S. government mandated 
an increase in transfer pricing enforcement to shore up its tax base.
 We additionally assume that, from a social welfare perspective, the domestic 
government values one dollar of domestic corporate profit as equal to one dollar of 
domestic consumer surplus. As tax revenues are derived from producer surplus and as we 
have already assumed that tax rates are identical across international jurisdictions, 
domestic social welfare is not a function of domestic tax rates in our analysis. 
16
( ) 00 ,,
p DF
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We define domestic social welfare in the sealed market setting,  , 
as the sum of domestic consumer and producer surplus.  This surplus is a function of the 
quantity,  0
D q , produced for the domestic economy plus the profits from the quantity,  0
F q , 
produced for the foreign market and repatriated at transfer price p.  
                                                           
14 For additional analysis of the combined social surplus ramifications of gray markets see Maskus and 
Chen (2004). 
 
15 That is, increasing the cost base of an already comparatively high-cost gray market producer has a 
smaller domestic welfare impact as the number of domestic competitors increases. 
 














SW q pq α = −+

          (12) 
In the sealed market setting, we define the change in domestic social welfare 
following a shift from the multinational’s optimal transfer price to the multinational’s 
arm’s length transfer price as 
Darm D pp p
DD D SW SW SW ∆= − . 
The inclusion of the gray market firm shifts the domestic competitive landscape 
from a monopoly to a Cournot duopoly.  We define domestic social welfare in the gray 
market setting,
P
GD SW ( ) 00 ,,,
GD GD GF
g p qqq, as the sum of domestic consumer and producer 
surplus.  The surplus from the domestic production follows methods established by Singh 
and Vives (1984). The repatriated profits are based on the quantity,  0
GF q , produced for the 
foreign market and internal transfer price p. 
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GD D g g g SW q q q q q q pq αγ = +− + + +
 
  (13) 
In the gray market setting, we define the change in domestic  social welfare 
following a shift from the multinational’s optimal transfer price to the multinational’s 
arm’s length transfer price as 
GDarm GD pp p
GD GD GD SW SW SW ∆= − . 
Next, we similarly define the foreign economy’s social welfare function in both 
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          (15)   18 
Note that the repatriated profits are subtracted from each welfare function. As 
above, 
p
F SW ∆  and 
p
GF SW ∆  represent the change in foreign social welfare following a 
shift from the multinational’s optimal transfer price to the multinational’s arm’s length 
transfer price in the sealed and gray market settings, respectively.  
To obtain total social welfare (i.e., encompassing both markets) under a given 
transfer pricing regime in a sealed market setting,  we combine the social welfare 
functions in (12) and (14) to form (16) below. Similarly, to obtain total social welfare in a 
gray market setting we combine (13) and (15) to form (17) below. 
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  (17) 
  Note that the repatriated profits are no longer a part of the total social welfare 
functions in (16) and (17),  as  the repatriated profit component of  the domestic and 
foreign social surplus functions cancel each other out. Finally, 
p
DF SW + ∆  and 
p
GD GF SW + ∆  
represent the change in total social welfare following a shift from the multinational’s 
optimal transfer price to the multinational’s arm’s length transfer price in the sealed and 
gray market settings, respectively. 
Proposition 3.  When  market segments are sealed, mandating a shift from  the 
multinational’s optimal transfer price,
D p , to an arm’s length transfer price, 
D arm p , has 
the following results. 
1.  The profit of the domestic subsidiary is higher under arm’s length transfer pricing 
(i.e.,  00
D arm D Dp Dp ππ > ). 
2.  The overall profit of the multinational firm is lower under arm’s length pricing 
(i.e.,  0 0 00
Darm Darm D D Dp Fp Dp Fp π π ππ + <+ ).   19 
3.  Arm’s length transfer pricing strictly increases domestic social surplus (i.e., 
0
p
D SW ∆>  ). 
4.  Arm’s length transfer pricing strictly decreases both foreign social surplus (i.e., 
0
p
F SW ∆< ) and total social surplus (i.e.,  0
p
DF SW + ∆< ). 
When there is no product leakage between market segments, a switch to arm's length 
transfer pricing does indeed strictly increase  domestic social welfare (as arm's length 
transfer pricing maximizes the foreign profits repatriated back to the domestic firm 
without affecting competition in the domestic setting), but leaves the multinational, 
foreign economy, and economy as a whole worse off due to the double marginalization of 
the foreign subsidiary. 
Proposition 4. In a gray market setting, mandating a shift from the firm’s optimal 
transfer price, 
GD p , to an arm’s length transfer price of, 
GD arm p , has the following 
results. 
1.  The profit of the domestic subsidiary is higher under arm’s length transfer pricing 
(i.e.,  00
arm D GD p GD p ππ > ). 
2.  The overall profit of the multinational firm is lower under arm’s length pricing 
(i.e., 0 0 00
arm arm D D GD p GF p GD p GF p π π ππ + <+).  
3.  There exists a threshold R







> then  domestic  social surplus is lower under arm’s length 
pricing (i.e., 0
p







< then  domestic social surplus  is higher under arm’s  length 
pricing (i.e.,  0
p








>  then  0
p
GD SW ∆<  for all  ( ] 0,1 γ ∈ .  
4.  Arm’s length transfer pricing strictly decreases both foreign social surplus (i.e., 
0
p
GF SW ∆< ) and total social surplus (i.e.,  0
p
GD GF SW + ∆< ).   20 
The intuition behind the first two points and the last point are similar to that of 
Proposition 3. Two countervailing forces provide the tension in the third point. On the 
one hand, a shift to arm’s length transfer pricing increases the funds repatriated to the 
domestic market. This increases domestic social welfare by increasing the multinational’s 
domestic profits. On the other hand, increasing the transfer price to the foreign market 
increases the gray market firm’s cost base. This makes the gray market firm an even 
higher cost producer than it had originally been. The increased cost base makes the gray 
market both less profitable and a weaker competitor in the domestic market which in turn 
erodes consumer surplus. Thus, a shift to arm’s length transfer pricing leads to a tension 
between two forces which push social welfare in opposite directions. This tension can 
lead to an erosion of domestic social welfare, if the domestic market is sufficiently larger 
than the foreign one. Figure 3 illustrates this tradeoff. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE>> 
Finally, we investigate the circumstances under which the multinational’s optimal 
transfer price also  maximizes the domestic economy’s social welfare. To derive the 
transfer price which maximizes domestic social welfare, we maximize (13) with respect 
to p.
17
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  The results are presented in Lemma 4. 
Lemma 4. In a gray market setting, the transfer price that maximizes the social welfare 
of the domestic economy is  
. 
Proposition 5.  In a gray market setting,  the transfer price that maximizes the 
multinational’s profits may also be the same one that maximizes the social welfare of the 
domestic economy that houses it.  However, the arm’s length transfer price is never the 
one that maximizes the social welfare of the domestic economy. 
                                                           
17 As in the previous settings, we assume that transfer prices are weakly positive and all quantities and end-
user prices are strictly positive. 
   21 
This result is at the nexus of normative and positive accounting research (see 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978)). Specifically, this result suggests that, in the presence of 
gray markets, the accounting choice that is best for the multinational may, in certain 
cases, also be the one that is best for the domestic economy that houses it. In contrast, an 
arm’s length transfer price can never be the transfer price that is best for the domestic 
economy that houses the multinational.   
The implications of Propositions 4-6 suggest a rethink to the social benefits of 
mandating  arm’s length transfer pricing for a domestic economy. In a sealed market 
setting, only the domestic economy  is better off with arm’s length transfer pricing. 
However, in the gray market setting, allowing the firm to set its own transfer price may 
lead to Pareto improvements for all economic participants when compared to the arm’s 
length transfer pricing option, provided the domestic market is sufficiently larger than the 
foreign one.
18
In a sealed market setting, entering the foreign market has no impact on domestic 
competition, so the multinational will always be better off entering the foreign market. In 
a gray market setting, however, entry reduces the domestic subsidiary’s profits through 
increased competition. The multinational enters the foreign market when its expected 
 More broadly, the combined results question the role of regulation when an 
unregulated market can generate Pareto improvements to the laws imposed by regulators.  
3.5 Robustness – multinational entry into the foreign market   
  Given that the multinational itself is the source of gray market goods, one way for 
it to avoid the increased competition in its domestic market is to choose not to enter the 
foreign market in the first place.  In this subsection, we verify whether the multinational 
opts to address the gray market problem by avoiding entry.  In particular, we analyze the 
multinational’s decision to enter the foreign market and derive conditions under which 
the multinational is better off entering the foreign market  despite the resulting gray 
market.   
                                                           
18 Given that the multinational seeks to maximize aggregate profits, we assume that the profits of the 
multinational, and not those of its subsidiaries, are used to evaluate the possibility for Pareto improvements 
when changing transfer pricing regimes.   22 
profit in a gray market setting (from Lemma 2) exceeds  the expected profit of a 
standalone domestic subsidiary in a sealed setting (from Lemma 1): 
( ) 00 0
GF GD D ππ π +>                 (18)  
As in the social welfare analysis, we fix the number of domestic competitors at n=0 and 
solve  (18)  to derive  the  conditions under which  the  multinational  enters  the foreign 
market. 
Proposition 6 There exists a threshold 






<  it is in the 
multinational’s best interest to enter the foreign market. 
Intuitively, the multinational enters the foreign market when the market is 
sufficiently large to offset the anticipated reduction in domestic profits.  Failure to enter 
is most likely to occur when the gray market good is a close substitute and cannibalizes 
domestic sales (i.e.,  γ  very close to 1).  Accordingly, this constraint only binds for 
relatively large γ. Interestingly, 
* R , the threshold over which the domestic economy is 
worse off under arm’s length pricing, is decreasing in γ over the interval of  [ ] 0,1 γ ∈ , so 
that when this constraint does bind, arm’s length transfer pricing reduces domestic social 
welfare. Figure 4 presents an example where all three constraints (gray market capacity, 
gray market non-negativity, and multinational entry) are met, and where the domestic 
social surplus is higher when the firm sets its own transfer price versus mandating arm’s 
length pricing. 
<<INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE>> 
5. Conclusion 
  Following the work of Hirshleifer (1956), we illustrate that a multinational’s 
optimal transfer price to an affiliated foreign monopolist (i.e., a consolidated subsidiary) 
is strictly higher than marginal cost when goods produced for a foreign market are leaked 
back to the  domestic  market. We extend Hirshleifer’s results by further defining the 
optimal transfer price in terms of the number of competitors in the domestic economy and   23 
the level of differentiation between the foreign and domestic products. More importantly, 
while Hirshleifer illustrates that the optimal transfer price between affiliated segments is 
a function of the nature of downstream competition, we illustrate that, conditional on 
there being product leakage from the downstream to the upstream market, the optimal 
transfer price is additionally a function of the nature of upstream competition. 
We also illustrate that gray markets may cause unintended social welfare 
consequences when domestic governments mandate the use of arm’s length transfer 
prices between international subsidiaries. Specifically, a shift to arm’s length transfer 
pricing erodes domestic consumer surplus by making the gray market less competitive 
domestically.  When the domestic market is sufficiently large relative to the foreign 
market, the domestic welfare destruction arising from this erosion dominates the 
domestic welfare gains that accompany a shift to arm’s length transfer pricing. 
Additionally,  we find that in the presence of a gray market, the transfer price that 
maximizes a multinational’s profits may also be the same one that maximizes the social 
welfare of the domestic economy that houses it. 
  It should be noted, however, that the study provides only a partial equilibrium 
analysis. For example, tax rates are exogenously set to be equal across international 
jurisdictions despite the fact that governments clearly set tax rates strategically. A full 
equilibrium analysis would incorporate the objectives of domestic and foreign tax 
authorities and derive tax rates endogenously.  
Additionally, the domestic  government’s social welfare preferences are set 
exogenously. Specifically, the analysis assumes that the  government places  an equal 
value on one dollar of consumer surplus and one dollar of producer surplus. If, for 
example, the government has a preference for generating tax revenues to  creating 
consumer surplus, we may expect to see it favoring policy that places a higher value on 
producer surplus. However, there is also reason to expect the opposite to be true. First, 
Baron (1988, p. 467) suggests that, “if there is a strong electoral connection between 
benefits delivered to constituents and their electoral support, the legislature will choose a 
regulatory mandate that favors consumers over producer interests…”. Second, weighting 
the government’s objective function toward consumer surplus may be particularly   24 
appropriate in a gray market setting, given the historic unwillingness of domestic 
governments to curtail gray market activity. If we weight the objectives of the 
government more heavily in favor of consumers, then the negative consequences to 
imposing the arm’s length standard become even larger. 
Despite the partial nature of the equilibrium, the findings provide several insights. 
First, the results suggest several avenues for tax regulators to more effectively allocate 
resources for  enforcement of the arm’s length standard. For example, targeting 
multinationals which observe little product leakage from foreign markets or which 
operate in domestic markets that are sufficiently competitive may lead to net welfare 
gains for the domestic  economy. Conversely, focusing enforcement efforts on 
multinationals that work in industries where gray markets provide the only means of 
domestic competition may make the domestic economy worse off. Second, the results 
provide partial explanations for both the variation in intracompany discounts across 
multinationals, and the perceived lax attitude to transfer pricing regulation enforcement 
by governments. In the first case, intracompany discounts to foreign subsidiaries may be 
a function of both domestic competition and the homogeneity of a company’s domestic 
and foreign products. In the second case, the appearance of lax enforcement may simply 
be a byproduct of regulators’ disincentive to enforce transfer pricing regulations when the 
domestic market reaps benefits from increased competition.    25 
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Figure 3.  Domestic social surplus under arm’s length transfer pricing (solid line) versus the multinational’s optimal pricing (dashed line).  
(γ = 0.2)   
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Figure 4.  Domestic social surplus in a gray market setting under arm’s length transfer pricing (solid line) versus the multinational’s 
optimal pricing (dashed line).  (γ = 0.55)     29 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma 1 
In an economy with sealed market segments, firm 0 chooses  0
F q  to maximize 
Equation (1) and  0
D q to maximize (2). Firm 0’s rivals choose  ,0
i
D qi ≠ , to maximize (3). 
Solving the maximization problems jointly yields  ( ) 0
F qp  and  ( ) ,
i
D qn γ , i = 0,…,n, the 
equilibrium quantities in the foreign and domestic markets. 




=                 (A1) 
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              (A3) 
Using  ( ) 0
F qp ,  ( ) 0 ,
D qn γ , and  ( ) ,, 0
i
D q ni γ ≠ ,  from (A1), (A2), and (A3) 
respectively, the multinational sets price p to maximize profits in Equation (4). Solving 
the first-order condition of (4) with respect to p  yields
D p in Lemma 1. Substituting 
D p into (A1) yields  0
F q . Substituting 
D p and  0
F q into Equation (1), 
D p , 0
F q , ( ) 0 ,
D qn γ , and 
( ) ,, 0
D
i q ni γ ≠ , into Equation (2), and  ( ) 0 ,
D qn γ and  ( ) ,, 0
D
i q ni γ ≠  into Equation (3), 
yields  0
F π , ( ) 0 ,
D n πγ ,  ( ) ,, 0
D
i ni πγ ≠ , respectively. This proves Lemma 1.              ■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 2 
Firm 0 chooses  0
GD q to maximize (6), firm 0’s n  domestic  rivals choose 
, 0,
i
GD qi g ≠ , to maximize (7), and firm g chooses 
GD
g q  to maximize (8). Solving the 
maximization problem jointly yields  ( ) 0 ,
i
GD GF q pq ,  i  = 0, …, n,  g  , the equilibrium 
quantities in the domestic market. 
Next, firm 0 chooses  0
GF q to maximize Equation (5). This leads to an equilibrium 
quantity in the foreign market of: 




= .                (A4)   30 
Plugging  ( ) 0
GF qp into  ( ) 0 ,
i
GD GF q pq , i = 0, …, n, g yields  ( )
i
GD qp , i = 0, …, n, g , 
the equilibrium quantities in the domestic market as follows: 
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Using  ( ) 0
GF qp ,  ( ) 0
GD qp ,  ( ), 0,
i
GD q pi g ≠ , and  ( )
GD
g qp  from (A4), (A5), (A6) and (A7), 
respectively, the multinational sets price p to maximize profits in Equation (9). Solving 
the first-order condition of (9) with respect to p  yields  ( ) ,
GD pn γ in Lemma 2. 
Substituting  ( ) ,
GD pn γ   into (A4),  (A5),  (A6),  and (A7) yields  ( ) 0 ,
GF qn γ   and 
( ) , , 0,..., ,
GD
i q n i ng γ = . Substituting  ( ) ,
GD pn γ   and  ( ) 0 ,
GF qn γ   into (5),  ( ) ,
GD pn γ , 
( ) 0 ,
GF qn γ , and  ( ) , , 0,..., ,
GD
i q n i ng γ = , into (6),   ( ) , , 0,..., ,
GD
i q n i ng γ = , into (7), and 
( ) , , 0,..., ,
GD
i q n i ng γ =   and  ( ) 0 ,
GF qn γ   into  (8)  yields  ( ) 0 ,
GF n πγ,  ( ) 0 ,
GD n πγ, 
( ) , , 0,
GD
i ni g πγ ≠ , and  ( ) ,
GD
g n πγ, respectively. This proves Lemma 2.                ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
   The derivative of  ( ) ,
GD pn γ  with respect to n is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
2 22 2




D FD n pn
n n
γ γ α γα α γ γ γ
γ γγ γ
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γ → =  and lim 0
GD
n p
→∞ = (claim 2).     
Finally, marginal costs are assumed normalized to zero. Thus,  ( ) ,
GD pn γ must be 
strictly greater than 0 for the optimal transfer price in the gray market setting to be higher 
than marginal cost, or:   31 
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The numerator is strictly positive for all values of  ( ] 0,1 γ ∈ , thus  ( ) ,
GD pn γ  is positive iff 
( ) ( )
22 2 22n γ γγ γ − ++ > . Because ( )
2 21 γ −≥   and  ( )
2 22 n γγ ++ >, their product 
must be greater than 
2 (0,1] γ ∈ .  Thus, the denominator of  ( ) ,
GD pn γ  is strictly positive, 
and hence  ( ) ,
GD pn γ  is also strictly positive for all values of  ( ] 0,1 γ ∈  (claim 3). This 
proves Proposition 1.                               ■ 
 
Proof of Observation 1 
The derivatives of  ( ) 0
GF qp  and  ( )
GD
g qp with respect to p are 




















Next,  ( ) 0
GF qp  changes faster than  ( )
GD












 Thus, as p 
decreases,  ( ) ( ) 0
GF GD
g q pq p −  has a net increase. (Claim 1) 
Both  ( ) 0
GF qp  and  ( )
GD
g qp  are linear in p, so for sufficiently low p, both constraints 
are met.  To obtain the cutoff values   and 
Cap NonNeg pp ,  we  solve the expressions 
( ) ( ) 0
GF GD
g qpqp >  and  ( ) 0
GD
g qp > , respectively, for p.  This yields: 
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For both gray market quantity constraints to be met,  ( ) ,
GD pn γ  must be less than 
{ } min ,
NonNeg Cap pp .  The relevant cutoff depends on:   32 
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NonNeg Cap pp > , and meeting the capacity constraint is sufficient.   
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  (claim 2). 










  then 
Cap NonNeg pp > , and meeting the non-negativity 
constraint is sufficient.   
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      (claim 3). 
Combining conditions in claims 2 and 3 proves claim 4, completing the proof.  ■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 3 
In an economy with sealed market segments, using  ( ) 0
F qp , ( ) 0 ,
D qn γ , and 
( ) ,, 0
i
D q ni γ ≠ , from (A1), (A2), and (A3) respectively, the multinational sets price p to 
maximize domestic profits in Equation (10). Solving the first-order condition of (10) with   33 
respect to p yields 
Darm p  in Lemma 3. In an economy with a gray market firm, using 
( ) 0
GF qp ,  ( ) 0
GD qp ,  ( ), 0,
i
GD q pi g ≠ ,  and  ( )
GD
g qp   from (A4), (A5), (A6) and (A7), 
respectively, the multinational sets price p to maximize domestic profits in (11). The 
first-order condition of (11) with respect to p yields  ( ) ,
GD arm pn γ  in Lemma 3. This 
proves Lemma 3.                                    ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
  0
Darm p >  is clearly greater than
D p . To illustrate that ( ) ( ) ,,
GD arm GD p np n γγ > , 
we show that  ( ) ( ) ,,
GD arm GD p np n γγ ≤  cannot be true. If  ( ) ( ) ,,
GD arm GD p np n γγ ≤ , then: 





DDF D FD B
BB





,      (A8) 
where  ( ) ( )
2 2 2 1  and  2 A n BA γγ ≡+ + ≡ − . 
Rearranging terms in (A8) yields 

























2 B γ = . Thus, if B>
2 γ , then the denominator is strictly positive. The 
proof of Proposition 1 establishes that B>
2 γ  for all values of n and ( ] 0,1 γ ∈ . Since B>0 
for all  ( ] 0,1 γ ∈ , the inequality in (A8) holds if  ( ) ( ) 22 0 FD F Bα γα γ αγ − −+ ≤ . 
Rearranging the terms yields: 












.          (A9) 
If (A9) holds, then the multinational’s optimal transfer price is equal to or larger 
than the intercept of the foreign market’s inverse demand curve. If this is true, the foreign 
subsidiary produces zero or negative values for  0
GF q ,  a violation of this paper’s 
assumptions. As such (A9), and in turn (A8), are never true. Thus, 
( ) ( ) ,,
GD arm GD p np n γγ > . This proves Proposition 2.                 ■   34 
Proof of Corollary 1 
The derivative of  ( ) ,
GD arm pn γ with respect to n is 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )




22 4 2 3 2 ,
0




γ γ α γ αγ γ γ γ
γγ γ γ
− − + ++ ∂
=−<
∂ + + − − + +−+
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→∞ = .  This proves Corollary 1.   ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
When markets are sealed from one another, Lemma 3 establishes  that 
Darm p  
maximizes the domestic segment’s profits in (10) and Lemma 1 establishes that 
D p  
maximizes the multinational’s profits in (4).  Proposition 2 establishes that 
D Darm pp ≠ . 
Thus the multinational is strictly better off with a transfer price of 
D p (claim 2) while the 
domestic firm is strictly better off with a transfer price of 
Darm p (claim 1). Substituting the 
values of 
Darm p  and 
D p into 
p







∆= >  (claim 3). Substituting the 
values of 
Darm p  and 
D p into 
p







∆= −< .  Substituting the values 
of 
Darm p   and 
D p into 
p







+ ∆ = −<   (claim  4).  This  proves 
Proposition 3.                                     ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
  When a gray market firm is present, Lemma 3 establishes that 
GDarm p  maximizes 
the domestic segment’s profits in (11) and Lemma 2 establishes that 
GD p  maximizes the 
multinational’s profits in (9). Proposition 2 establishes  that
GD GDarm pp ≠ . Thus the 
multinational is strictly better off with a transfer price of 
GD p (claim 2) while the 
domestic firm is strictly better off with a transfer price of 
GDarm p (claim 1).  
For notational convenience, define the following:   35 
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We seek the sign of 
GDarm GD pp
GD GD SW SW − .  Note that for all  (0,1] γ ∈ , I > F and J>G. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
GDarm GD pp DD
GD GD
FF
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 and two real roots.  Designate the smaller root as root 1 and 
the larger as root 2.  We also denote root 1 as 
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2 24
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 at which 
GDarm GD pp
GD GD SW SW −  flips from positive (i.e., where arm’s 
length transfer pricing improves domestic social welfare) to negative (i.e., where arm’s 













satisfying the gray market constraints falls in region where arm’s length transfer pricing 






> then  0
GDarm GD pp






< then  0
GDarm GD pp
GD GD SW SW −> . Below is a 
graphical representation for  0.2 γ =  (proof available from the authors upon request). 









Arm increases Dom estic SW 
Arm decreases Dom estic SW 
R R
mi n
   37 







* R is decreasing in 
γ over the interval of  [ ] 0,1 γ ∈ . Thus 
* R is at its largest when γ = 0, taking on the value 
* 11
8







> implies  0
GDarm GD pp
GD GD SW SW −< . (claim 3).        
 
p
GF SW  from equation (15) and 
p
GD GF SW +  from equation (17) are both decreasing in 
p  provided [ ) 0, F p α ∈ . As Proposition 2 establishes that  ( ) ( ) ,,
GD arm GD p np n γγ > , it 
follows that  0
p
GF SW ∆<  and  0
p
GD GF SW + ∆< (claim 4). This proves Proposition 4.            ■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 4 
In an economy with a gray market firm, we set n=0  and plug the values of 
( ) 0
F qp , ( ) 0
GD qp , and  ( )
GD
g qp  from (A4), (A5) and (A7), respectively, into Equation (13). 









. Differentiating (13) with respect to p 
yields: 
( ) ( ) ( )
2 24
24
28 13 2 2 2
68 35 4
FD GD SW p







This transfer price maximizes the social welfare of the domestic economy. This proves 
Lemma 4.                             ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
In an economy with a gray market firm where n=0, we set the transfer price that 
maximizes the multinational’s profit from Lemma 2,  ( )
GD p γ , equal to the transfer price 
that maximizes domestic social welfare from Lemma 4,  ( )
GD SW p γ . This yields: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 24
22 24 2
28 13 2 2 2 42
68 35 4 22






Rearranging the terms yields the following condition for  ( ) ( )
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          (A10) 
So for example if the economy has parameter values of  100 D α = ,  64.53 F α =  and .8 γ = , 
then per (A10),  ( ) ( ) , 21.91
GD GD SW p np γγ = = .  
Next, in an economy with a gray market firm where n=0, we set the 
multinational’s arm’s length transfer price from Lemma 3,  ( )
GD arm p γ , equal to the 
transfer price that maximizes domestic social welfare from Lemma 4,  ( )
GD SW p γ . This 
yields: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
22 2 2 24
22 24 2
(2 )(2 ) 2 2 28 13 2 2 2
68 35 4 22 2
DF FD αγ γα γ γ γ α γγ α γ
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Rearranging the terms yields the following condition for  ( ) ( )















            (A11) 
F α  is negative for all values of  ( ] 0,1 γ ∈ . A negative intercept for either market’s inverse 
demand function is a contradiction, and thus a multinational’s arm’s length transfer price 
in a gray market setting can never equal the price that maximizes the welfare of the 
domestic economy. This proves Proposition 5.                        ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 6 
Expanding (18) yields: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 22 3
24
1
4 2 4 16 13 0
4 16 9
DF F D α αγ γ αγ α γ γ γ
γγ
− −+ + −+ − − + >
−+
 
Simplifying this expression yields: 
( ) ( ) ( )
2
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yields two real roots. Designate the smaller 
root as root 1 and the larger as root 2.  We also denote root 2 as 
entry R :  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 2 2 23
3
2 2 2 23
3
2 2 4 2 4 16 13
root 1
16 13
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is greater than root 1 and thus root 1 cannot bind.  However, for sufficiently high values 
of  γ , (approx  0.96 γ = ), 
entry RR < , so it is possible that 
entry R may bind. It is 






<  satisfies (A12). This proves proposition 6. ■  